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A Priorean Approach to Time Ontologies 
Peter Øhrstrøm and Henrik Schärfe 
Department of Communication, Aalborg University, Denmark 
{poe, scharfe}@hum.aau.dk 
Abstract. Any non-trivial top-level ontology should take temporal notions into 
account. The details of how this should be done, however, are frequently de-
bated. In this paper it is argued that ”the four grades of tense-logical involve-
ment” suggested by A.N. Prior form a useful framework for discussing how 
various temporal notions are related in a top-level ontology. Furthermore, a 
number of modern ontologies are analysed with respect to their incorporation of 
temporal notions. It is argued that all of them correspond to Prior’s first and 
second grade, and that none of them reflect the views which Prior’s third and 
fourth grade represent. Finally, the paper deals with Prior’s ideas on a tensed 
ontology and it is argued that a logic based on the third grade and will be useful 
in the further development of tensed ontology. 
1   Introduction 
In post-Medieval logic ontology, conceived as the study of being or existence, was 
regarded as a very important field of study. Indeed, philosophers and logicians in the 
17th and 18th century were the first to establish the very word ‘ontology’ as a technical 
term naming the study of being or existence as such. One of the first philosophers to 
do so was Christian Wolff (1679-1754) who wanted to construct a logical system with 
which he could account for existence and non-existence. According to Wolff a ‘being’ 
or an ‘entity’ is whatever can be thought without involving any logical contradiction. 
This means that Wolffian ontology does not answer the question regarding what there 
is in the actual world. This question has to be answered within the so-called special 
metaphysics. In the 20th century, most philosophers interested in ontology have ac-
cepted the logical approach to ontology, but they have not been satisfied with the 
Wolffian notion of existence. In contrary, they mainly wanted to discuss the actual 
world, and not only the possible, but non-real worlds. Stanislaw Le niewski (1886-
1939) seems to have been the first logician to suggest a formal (deductive) calculus of 
ontology. The core of this contribution is mereology which deals with the part–whole 
relation between objects. In the 1950s another Polish logician, C. Lejewski, extended 
the Le niewskian calculus introducing a so-called ‘chronology’, according to which 
objects are conceived as corresponding to durations. 
In the works of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) 
there is a strong emphasis on ideas of time as a very important background for the 
study of ontology. This means that there is an essential relation between ontological 
inquiry and the study of the concept(s) of time (see [8]). In his philosophical logic 
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A.N. Prior (1914-69) put a similar emphasis claiming that temporal aspects are crucial 
for any satisfactory approach to reality. 
Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) was one of the most influential 20th century 
philosophers who contributed to the further development of ontology. In his ”On 
What There Is” [23]. Quine introduced a view of ontology as the study of the onto-
logical commitments of natural science (see [26]). According to Quine’s view the 
ontologist should derive a network of claims about what actually exists using the 
natural sciences as his main source. In addition the ontologist should attempt to estab-
lish what types of entities are most basic. For Quine first-order predicate logic is cru-
cial in the determination of what actually exists. According to his so-called ‘criterion 
of ontological commitment’ the ontologist can conclude that the ontological commit-
ment of a scientific theory implies the existence of certain entities (such as electrons) 
if the theory presupposes that these entities are values of bound variables when for-
mulated in first-order predicate logic. 
A.N. Prior found Lejewski’s as well as Quine’s ideas on ontology very challeng-
ing, and he offered an idea of ontology which may be seen as an alternative to both 
approaches. Prior accepted the importance of Lejewski’s attempt to involve time in 
the description of objects, but he found that the incorporation of time had to be carried 
out in a different manner. Prior’s accepted Quine’s idea that the ontologist should try 
to establish what types of entities are most basic, but he rejected the Quinean idea of 
letting ontology depend on what kinds of variables we are prepared to bind by quanti-
fiers. In his writings Prior produced a highly original way of dealing with the tempo-
ral aspects of reality and the notions of quantification. In fact Prior suggested four 
conceivable theories regarding the temporal aspects of reality (the so-called four 
grades of tense-logical involvement). In section 2 we are going to describe these theo-
ries in some details and we shall see how they allow for different scopes of quantifica-
tion. Each of the four theories suggests an ontology explaining how the various tem-
poral notions and concepts (such as ‘past’, ‘present’, ‘future’, ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘in-
stant’, ‘duration’) are mutually related. Although Prior stated that all four theories are 
possible, he himself clearly favoured the last of them (i.e. the 4th grade of tense-logical 
involvement). 
For at least two decades formal ontologies have been studied intensively within 
various parts of computer science (see Sowa [27], [28]). Knowledge representation is 
obviously one of the computer science disciplines in which formal ontology has 
turned out to be particularly important. According to T.R. Gruber [10] the term ‘on-
tology’ is used in this field as standing for »a specification of a conceptualization«, or 
to put it differently »a description (like a formal specification of a program) of the 
concepts and relationships that can exist for an agent or a community of agents«. This 
may be said to bring us back to the Wolffian notion of existence according to which 
an entity exists if it can be thought of without any contradiction. 
During recent years one of the most influential ideas within formal ontology has 
been the idea of a top-level ontology, which should include a small number of highly 
general categories. The benefits of such a top-level ontology is obvious when it comes 
to the development and application of information systems. Although very few be-
lieve that it will be possible ever to reach a universal agreement on the formulation of 
a non-trivial top-ontology, everybody working with information systems will accept 
the view that the problem of classification is crucial for the formulation of such sys-
tems. For this reason, the debates on formal ontology and classification should go on, 
and everybody working with information systems and knowledge engineering should 
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be aware of the ontological challenges to which the problems of concept handling 
give rise. 
Prior did not pursue Lejewski’s idea of a durational logic. However, other workers 
in temporal logic have done so. Their works show that the ontological relations be-
tween durations and instants are by no means given. Section 3 deals with the con-
struction of formal ontologies in the light of the works within durational logic.   
In section 4 we shall discuss the analysis of temporal notions according to some of 
the most well-known top-level ontologies, and we shall argue that most authors of 
modern ontologies, apparently without much reflection, assume something like 
Prior’s first or second grade of tense-logical involvement. In section 5 we intend to 
discuss these Priorean ideas of a tensed ontology. We shall see that there is still much 
to be done in order to carry out the full Priorean program. 
2   Prior’s Four Grades of Tense-Logical Involvement 
In his famous paper ‘The Unreality of Time’ [15] John Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925) 
suggested a distinction between A- and B-series, which in fact corresponds to a dis-
tinction between the following two sets of temporal notions: 
 
A-notions: past, present, future 
B-notions: before, after, ‘simultaneous with’ 
 
Since McTaggart, philosophers and logicians have discussed intensively which of 
the two sets is the ontologically more fundamental one for the philosophical descrip-
tion of time. During the 20th century several authors have tried to answer this question 
of temporal ontology in a formal manner. In fact, this discussion has turned out to be 
essential for the formulation of temporal logic. A.N. Prior (1914-69) who was the 
founder of modern temporal logic paid very much attention to this problem. In his 
brilliant and very important paper from 1968, ‘Tense Logic and the Logic of Earlier 
and Later’ [21: 117ff.], Prior introduced four so-called grades of tense-logical in-
volvement. These four grades can be understood as four different ways in which the 
question of temporal ontology can be answered.  
The first grade defines tenses entirely in terms of objective instants and an earlier-
later relation. For instance, a sentence such as Fp, ‘it will be the case that p’, is defi-
ned as a short-hand for ‘there exists some instant t which is later than now, and p is 
true at t’, and similarly for the past tense, Pp, i.e. 
  
(DF) T(t,Fp) ≡def ∃t1: t< t1 ∧ T(t1,p)  
(DP)  T(t,Pp) ≡def ∃t1: t1< t ∧ T(t1,p) 
 
Given that G ≡
def
 ~F~ (‘it is always going to be the case that …’) and that H ≡
def
 ~P~ 
(‘it has always been the case that …’) it easily follows that 
 
(DG) T(t,Gp) ≡
 
∀t1: t< t1 ⊃ T(t1,p)  
(DH) T(t,Hp) ≡
 
∀t1: t1< t⊃  T(t1,p)  
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According to this view, tenses can be considered as mere meta-linguistic abbrevia-
tions, so this is the lowest grade of tense logical involvement. Prior succinctly de-
scribed the first grade as follows:  
 
…there is a nice economy about it; it reduces the minimal tense logic to a by-
product of the introduction of four definitions into an ordinary first-order theory, 
and richer [tense logical] systems to by-products of conditions imposed on a rela-
tion in that theory. [21: 119] 
 
In the first grade, the tense operators (P, F, G, and H) are simply tools with which 
we can establish a handy way of summarizing the properties of the before-after rela-
tions, which constitute the B-theory of McTaggart. Hence, in the first grade temporal 
instants are viewed as something primitive and objective. Together with the before-
after-relation they are seen to be determining for a proper understanding of time and 
reality. According to this view tenses are deemed to have no independent ontological 
status. The same can be said about the modal operators,  and •, which correspond to 
necessity and possibility, respectively. These operators can be defined in the follow-
ing way: 
 
 p ≡def ∀t: T(t,p) 
 ◊p ≡def ∃t: T(t,p) 
 
 
The time ontology of the first grade can be presented in the following way: 
 
1st grade 
Primitive 
notions 
Instants. 
The before-after relation (<). 
The truth-function (‘true at an instant’), T(t,p). 
First order logic. 
Derived 
notions 
Tenses: past (P), always past (H), future(F), always future(G). 
Modalities: necessity (), possibility (•). 
 
 
This time ontology seems to be the dominating and most common way of under-
standing the temporal aspect of reality. The weaknesses of this approach are, how-
ever, rather obvious. The most important problem is that the first grade does not in-
clude any idea of ‘now’. In this system the present time can only be represented as an 
arbitrary instant. This is of course quite acceptable, if we take the view which Albert 
Einstein expresses in a letter to Michele Besso in the following way:  
 
There is no irreversibility in the basic laws of physics. You have to accept the idea 
that subjective time with its emphasis on the now has no objective meaning. 
[Quoted from [18: 203]] 
 
If the ‘Now’ and consequently also the other A-concepts are purely subjective, all 
we have to bother with when dealing with the objective world are the B-series. 
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Viewed in this way reality is just a four-dimensional co-ordinate system. Times are 
nothing but clock-readings and dates. Prior described this position in the following 
way: 
 
Whether the events are the case or merely have been or will be, is of no concern to 
the scientist, so he uses a language in which the difference between being, having 
been, and being about to be becomes inexpressible. [20: 323] 
 
However, Prior has argued that the following shows that even Einstein was a bit 
uncertain regarding the status of the ‘Now’: 
 
Einstein himself once said to Carnap that the problem of the Now worried him se-
riously. He explained that the experience of the Now means something special for 
men, something different from the past and the future, but that this important dif-
ference does not and cannot occur within physics. [21: 136-137]  
 
Prior, himself, insisted that ‘the Now’ is real, and consequently that the distinction 
between the tenses is real (see [9: 47]). In his view it would be mistaken to assume 
that the ‘Now’ and the tenses can be derived from the logic of earlier and later. For 
this reason he had to reject the first grade and turn to an ontology in which the tense-
logical aspect of reality is assumed to be fundamental. 
In the second grade of tense logical involvement, the ‘Now’ is in fact accepted as a 
primitive notion. Formally, in this theory ‘the Now’ can be treated as a prepositional 
constant, n. This means that according to this view A- and B-concepts are treated on a 
par. Specifically, a bare proposition p is treated as a syntactically full-fledged proposi-
tion, on a par with what Rescher and Urquhart [24] called ‘chronologically definite’ 
propositions such as T(t,p) (‘it is true at time t that p’). The point of the second grade 
is that a bare proposition with no explicit temporal reference is not to be viewed as an 
incomplete proposition. One consequence of this is that an expression such as 
T(t,T(t’,p)) is also well-formed, and of the same type as T(t,p) and p. In fact, p can be 
understood as being equivalent with T(n,p). i.e. p is true if and only if p is true now. 
Prior showed how such a system leads to a number of theses, which relate tense logic 
to the earlier-later calculus and vice versa [19: 119]. 
The philosophical implication of this second grade of tense logical involvement is 
that one must regard the basic A- and B-theory concepts as being on the same concep-
tual level. Neither set of concepts is conditioned by the other.  
 
 
2nd grade 
Primitive 
notions 
Instants. The Now, n. 
The before-after relation (<). 
The truth-function (‘true at an instant’), T(t,p). 
First order logic. 
Derived 
notions 
Tenses: past (P), always past (H), future(F), always future(G). 
Modalities: necessity (), possibility (•). 
 
 
However, Prior also rejected the idea that time is made up of objectively existing 
instants. Formally this understanding of time can be expressed in terms of the third or 
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fourth grade of tense-logical involvement. According to Prior the crucial idea of the 
third grade ”consists in treating the instant-variables a, b, c, etc. as representing 
propositions.” [21: 124]  
Such instant-propositions describe the world uniquely at any given instant, and are 
for this reason also called world-state propositions. Like Prior we shall use a, b, c ... 
as instant-propositions instead of t
1
, t
2
, ... In fact, Prior assumed that such propositions 
are what ought to be meant by ‘instants’: 
 
A world-state proposition in the tense-logical sense is simply an index of an in-
stant; indeed, I would like to say that it is an instant, in the only sense in which ‘in-
stants’ are not highly fictitious entities. [19: 188-189] 
 
The traditional distinction between the description of the content and the indication 
of time for an event is thereby dissolved. This means that ordinary propositional logic 
in insufficient here. With his formulation of the third grade, Prior actually became the 
first logician to explore the formalism of hybrid languages which are now known in 
so-called hybrid logic (see http://www.hylo.net). 
The axioms of the logical language, which embodies the third grade of tense logi-
cal involvement, are in the first place the following axioms of a basic tempo-modal 
logic: 
 
(A1) p, where p is a tautology of the propositional calculus 
(A2) G(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Gp ⊃ Gq)   
(A3)  H(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Hp ⊃ Hq) 
(A4)  p ⊃ GPp  
(A5)  p ⊃ HFp 
(1) (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) 
(2) p ⊃ p 
(3) p ⊃ p 
(G) p ⊃ Gp 
(H) p ⊃ Hp 
 
 
In addition, in order to deal with the instant propositions involved in the hybrid lan-
guage of the third grade Prior added the following axioms: 
 
(I1)  ∃a: a 
(I2) ~~a 
(I3) (a ⊃ p) ∨ (a ⊃ ~p) 
(BF) (∀a: φ(a)) ≡ ∀a: (φ(a)) 
 
where a stands for an instant proposition, whereas p stands for any proposition. Given 
these axioms and some standard rules of reference Prior was able to prove a number 
of interesting theses for this hybrid language corresponding to the third grade. He 
argued that within this system T(a,p) as well as the before-after-relation can be defi-
ned in terms of the tenses and a primitive necessity-operator . Formally, this can be 
done in the following way: 
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T(a,p) ≡
def 
(a ⊃ p) 
a<b ≡
def 
(b ⊃ Pa) 
 
Prior demonstrated convincingly, that T and < defined in this way fulfill every-
thing which holds for the corresponding notions in the first grade. (See [21: 124 ff.])  
For instance, Prior proved that the formulae (DF) and (DP) hold with instant proposi-
tions instead of temporal instants. 
In the third grade all of temporal logic can be developed from the purely ‘modal 
notions’ of past, future, and necessity. The corresponding time ontology can be pre-
sented in the following manner: 
 
 
3rd grade 
Primitive 
notions 
Tenses: past (P), future(F). Modality: necessity (). 
- Hybrid logic. 
Derived 
notions 
Instants. 
The before-after relation (<). 
The truth-function (‘true at an instant’), T(t,p). 
Derived tenses: always past (H), always future(G). 
Derived modality: possibility (•). 
 
 
In some logics the truth-function involves not only propositions and instants, but 
also chronicles (i.e. ‘totally ordered subsets of instants’) cf. [31: 211] ). In these logics 
the truth-functions becomes T(t,c,p), where t is an instant belonging to the chronicle c. 
T(t,c,p) can be read ‘p is true at t on c’. However, this complication is not needed in 
the third grade, where the instant propositions also include the information corre-
sponding to the chronicle. 
The fourth grade may be seen as a continuation of the third grade, from which all 
definitions are carried over. However, according to the view corresponding to the 
fourth grade a tense logical definition of the necessity-operator can be established, if 
the future operator is understood as corresponding to ‘possible future’ and not some 
sort of ‘factual future’ (i.e. in this case ‘future’ has to be take in the Peircean sense cf. 
[31: 220]). This means that in the fourth grade the only primitive operators are the 
two tense logical ones: P and F. Within the hybrid logic all other notions can be de-
fined from these two tense operators. This means that the corresponding time ontol-
ogy can be presented in the following way: 
 
 
4th grade 
Primitive 
notions 
Tenses: past (P), future(F) 
- Hybrid logic. 
Derived 
notions 
Instants. 
The before-after relation (<). 
The truth-function (‘true at an instant’), T(t,p). 
Tenses: always past (H), always future(G). 
Modalities: necessity (), possibility (•). 
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Prior himself favoured this fourth grade. It appears that his reasons for wanting to 
reduce modality to tenses were mainly metaphysical, since it has to do with his rejec-
tion of the concept of the (one) true (but still unknown) future.  
In the systems corresponding to the third and the fourth grade of tense-logical in-
volvement it is assumed that it is possible to quantify over instant propositions. If 
Quine’s so-called ‘criterion of ontological commitment’ is accepted, it follows that 
instants (conceived as instant propositions) actually exist in reality. However, Prior did 
not accept this conclusion. In fact, Prior rejected Quine’s criterion. According to his idea 
of existence we do not have to accept the existence of instants just because we are pre-
pared to bind them by quantifiers. Existence is rather a question of ”what variables we 
take seriously as individual variables in a first-order theory, i.e. as subjects of predicates 
rather than as assertibilia which may be qualified by modalities” [21: 220]. When 
viewed in this way, we can conclude that instants do not exist in reality. As Prior put it, 
”they don’t exist; rather, they are or are not the case”. [21: 220] 
3   The Role of Durations in Time Ontology 
The notion of a ‘duration’ is obviously important, when it comes to the study of tem-
poral ontology. Several logicians have tried to formulate a logic of duration. In fact, 
already the medieval logician John Buridan (ca. 1295-1358) regarded the present as a 
duration and not as a point in time. Indeed, he made a number of important contribu-
tions to the development durational logic (see [31: 43 ff.].  
The first modern logician to formulate a calculus in this field was A.G. Walker 
[29], who considered a structure (S,<), where S is a non-empty set of periods. 
The ‘a<b’-relation is to be considered as ‘strict’ in the sense that no overlap bet- 
ween a and b is permitted, and the ordering is supposed to be irreflexive, asymmetri-
cal, and transitive. In addition he considered the notion of overlap, which can be de-
fined as: 
 
a | b  ≡
def
~(a<b ∨ b<a). 
 
Walker formulated an axiomatic system using the following two axioms: 
 
(W1) a | a  
(W2) (a<b ∧ b | c ∧ c < d ) ⊃ a < d  
 
Using a set-theoretic method base Walker demonstrated that it is possible to define 
instants in terms of durations. For this reason it may be reasonable to view a temporal 
instant as such a ‘secondary’ construct from the logic of durations. In the 1950s C. 
Lejewski worked out a so-called ‘chronology’ according to which objects are con-
ceived as corresponding to durations. This work should actually be seen as an exten-
sion of the Leśniewskian calculus, which appears to have been the first formal ontol-
ogy. [25: 18 ff.]  
In 1972 Charles Hamblin [11] independently also put forth a theory of the logic of 
durations. He achieved his results using a different technique involving the relation: 
 
a meets b ≡
def
 a<b ∧ ~(∃c: a<c ∧ c<b)) 
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A decade later, similar considerations have been put forward within artificial intel-
ligence research, notably by James Allen and Patrick Hayes [3], [4], [5], [6], who has 
analysed further details of durational logic. Allen and Hayes have shown that two 
arbitrary durations (in linear time) can be related in exactly 13 ways. 
It has been argued in [31: 304 ff.] that Walker’s and Hamblin’s theories 
are equivalent when seen from an ontological point of view. They all support the 
claim that just as durations (temporal interval) set-theoretically can be constructed 
from an instant-logic, it is possible to do the opposite i.e. to construct instants mathe-
matically from durations. In fact, all the durational theories put forth so far appear to 
give rise to the same ontological model. Given the set of instants and the before-after 
relation we may define chronicles as linear ordered subsets of the total set of total set 
of instants.  
The theories formulated by Walker, Hamblin, and Allen can all be said to be 
B-theoretical. It is however also possible to take an A-theoretical approach to dur-
ational logic. This can in fact be done in two different ways. Already John Buridan 
suggested these two alternative ideas for the construction of the logic of tenses. 
Firstly, the tenses, past and future, can be taken absolutely, in the sense that no part of 
the present time is said to be past or future. Secondly, tenses can be taken in the rela-
tive sense, according to which ”the earlier part of the present time is called past 
with respect to the later, and the later part is called future with respect to the earlier.” 
[7: 175] 
In addition, Buridan pointed out that if some thing is moving now, then there is a 
part of the present during which it is moving, and hence, it is moving in some part of 
the present, which is earlier than some other part of the present. Therefore, if the thing 
is moving, then it was moving (if the past is taken in the relative sense). For this rea-
son, the Aristotelian sophism must be conceded if the past is understood relatively. In 
a modern formal language Buridan’s idea of a relative past can be stated in the fol-
lowing way: 
 
T(I
n
,P
rel
A) ≡
def 
∀I’: included(I’,I
n
) ⊃ (∃I’’: I"<I’ ∧ T(I",A)) 
 
whereas the absolute past can be defined as  
 
T(I,P
abs
p) ≡
def 
∃Ι
1
: I< I
1
 ∧ T(I
1
,p) 
 
In modern durational logic a similar distinction has been introduced by Röper and 
others (see [31: 312 ff]). It turns out, that given that time can be viewed as a structure 
like the ordered set of real numbers and that durations are just open intervals, it can be 
shown that P
rel
 ≡ G
abs
P
abs
. There are of course a lot of details to be worked out here. 
But in the cases in which this equivalence holds, we obviously do not need to take 
both sets of tenses as primitives since the relative tenses can be derived from the abso-
lute tenses. 
It will be possible to combine the distinction between durations and instants with 
the above discussion about Prior four grades. If we assume Prior’s third grade and that 
durations should be derived from instants we get an ontology, which can be outlined 
as indicated in the schema below: 
 
3rd grade extended with durations 
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Primitive 
notions 
Tenses: past (P), future (F). 
Modality: necessity (). 
- Hybrid logic. 
Derived 
notions 
Instants. 
Chronicles. 
The before-after relation (<). 
A truth-function: T(t,p) 
Derived tenses: always past (H), always future (G). 
Derived modality: possibility (•). 
Secondary 
derived 
notions. 
Durations. 
Durational absolute tenses: P
abs, Habs, Fabs, Gabs 
Durational relative tenses: P
rel, Hrel, Frel, Grel 
 
 
On the other hand, if we assume Prior’s third grade and that instants should be de-
rived from durations things become much more complicated. But although there are a 
number of open questions regarding the precise procedures, it is very likely that it will 
be possible to develop an ontology based on durational tenses and hybrid logic. 
4   Analysis of Some Current Time Ontologies 
In light of the growing number of available ontologies, and the emerging need to 
collect information from different ontological descriptions, it becomes increasingly 
important to evaluate ontologies. It is sometimes said that the better ontology is one, 
which fulfills its purpose. There is obviously some truth in that, but if the purpose 
includes interoperability or the ability to merge with other ontologies, this question 
becomes much more complex. In the process of designing ontologies, the ontologist 
must on one hand take into account competing or comparable efforts and on the other 
hand pay special attention to the main purpose of the ontology. The Cyc ontology, for 
instance, is concerned with encompassing common knowledge whereas the DAML 
Time ontology deals with how to handle web documents. Clearly, the purpose of the 
ontology is reflected in the choice of words and concepts as well as in matters like 
expressive power and granularity.    
The question of how to evaluate and compare ontologies must extend beyond mat-
ters of aligning lists of concepts, and also take into account the deeper lying intention 
and metaphysical positions behind the respective ontologies. These questions are 
broad and complicated, not least because top-level ontologies by nature deal with 
many different domains. In order to describe and compare different ontological ap-
proaches, a larger framework is needed. Top-level ontologies are likely to diverge in 
many other areas than that of temporal notions. In fact, we believe that a similar effort 
may be appropriate in several other dimensions than the one under consideration here. 
However, considering the fundamental status of time, this seems an appropriate place 
to start. In order to analyze temporal notions in ontologies, we suggest using Prior’s 
four grades. Once the framework has been properly established, the procedure of 
comparing ontologies simply consists in looking for the relevant primitives from 
which other notions are defined, and map them to one of the grades. It turns out that 
such an analysis at the surface level is quite simple, and it is likely that it can be 
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automated, but also that slight differences in terminology and style of representation 
may complicate such analyses tremendously.  
In order to compare some influential time ontologies we shall in the following ex-
amine their primitive and derived notions. To our knowledge, most ontologies that 
deals with temporal notions have instants as well as intervals as primitives, and as 
such, they are only slightly different. The DAML Time ontology [12] refers to this as 
instants and intervals, and the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) [13] uses 
time-points and time-intervals. In OpenCyc [17] TimeInterval is seen as a direct gen-
eralization of TimePoint, indicating that TimePoints are defined in terms of intervals, 
but in effect TimePoints are treated as primitive notions. 
The before-after relation is also common to most time ontologies although it is ex-
pressed in different ways. In SUMO an earlier relation is defined over intervals and a 
before relation is defined over time points (instants). DAML Time uses only a before 
relation from which all other temporal relations are defined, and OpenCyc has two 
primitive temporal predicates (after and simultaneousWith) for defining an order 
between temporal elements. No before-relation is formally defined in OpenCyc, but 
the documentation clearly shows how the semantics of ‘before’ is distributed over 
several complex temporal predicates. This choice in ordering corresponds to 
McTaggart’s B-series.  
Corresponding to the truth-function T(a,p), most ontologies have predicates that 
link events to times, such as the (holdsIn TEMP-THING FORMULA) of OpenCyc 
which says that a formula is true at every moment in the extent of TemporalThing i.e. 
TimeInterval or TimePoint. Ontologies that satisfy these conditions qualify as first 
grade ontologies. The crucial distinction between first and second grade is the notion 
of Now and the consequences thereof.  
In DAML Time this predicament is partially avoided by considering concepts like 
‘now’ and ‘today’ as deictic times, relative to some document or utterance. The 
documentation briefly mentions the possibility of defining past and future in terms of 
this deictic ‘now’ and the before relation. [12: section 7]. A similar but more explicit 
solution is used by the TERQAS group [22] associated with the TimeML effort [2]. In 
identifying temporal attributes of events for Question Answering systems, the 
TERQAS group distinguishes between absolute and relative time according to the 
document date [1: section 4].  Likewise, SUMO has no formal definition of ‘now’ but 
the provided mapping between SUMO and WordNet points to ‘now’ as simply a time 
point. In consequence hereof, ‘past’ and ‘future’ does not share ontological status 
with time-intervals, but are defined as functions that map a TimePosition to the 
TimeInterval which it meets and which begins / ends at PositiveInfinity / NegativeIn-
finity. In his treatment of processes, John Sowa follows a similar line of reasoning, 
but in addition, he explicitly defines ‘past’ by means of the indexical ‘Now’ and the 
B-like relation ‘succession’ [28: 207]. But where he in [27] was primarily concerned 
with representing grammatical structures [28] goes one step further in accounting for 
the special status of now.  
Common to these approaches is that ‘now’ is treated as an arbitrary indexical de-
fined in terms of the before-after relation. A more developed notion of now is found 
in OpenCyc. This ontology does, as the only top level ontology that we are aware of, 
have the notion of ‘Now’ as a primitive, and should therefore be considered a time 
ontology of the second grade. Surprisingly, OpenCyc has no definitions of ‘past’ and 
‘future’ as anything other than grammatical constructions, but as we have seen, the 
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tempo-logical notions of past and future can be derived in both the first and second 
grade. 
 
#$Now is a special #$TimePoint which denotes the current moment from the 
perspective of the instantiation of #$CycTheCollection that is currently being run 
(i.e. #$Cyc). […] Thus the referent of #$Now does not vary with the #$Microthe-
ory in which one asks (#$indexicalReferent #$Now ?X). Instead, the referent of 
#$Now varies from moment to moment down to the resolution of #$Cyc's central 
processing unit. [17] 
 
Prior strongly suggested that in building a temporal ontology we should take the dur-
ational existence of things or objects into account. He pointed out that talk about 
events »is really at bottom talk about things, and that what looks like talk about 
changes in events is really just slightly more complicated talk about changes in 
things« [21: 16]. Recently, Karl Erich Wolff and Wendsomde Yameogo [30] have 
introduced a conceptual analysis involving objects and their so-called ‘life tracks’. 
This approach mainly corresponds to Prior’s first grade. Something similar can be 
said about Pavel Kocura’s approach [14] with the addition that this work also involves 
a durational logic (e.g. reasoning about time intervals). 
In 1993 Bernard Moulin [16] has demonstrated how temporal information in dis-
courses can be modelled using the notion of a time coordinate system. In a very clear 
manner he has shown how the idea of a time axis, i.e. a set of ‘time points’ and total 
order relation, <, can be used in the definitions of time intervals, temporal objects and 
situations. Moulin has also shown how relations like ‘during’ and even rather compli-
cated tenses can be defined in his model. His approach turns out to be a rather elabo-
rated version of Prior’s first grade extended with temporal objects and time intervals 
(defined from ‘time points’). 
After having reviewed a number of contemporary and influential time ontologies, 
we have not found any that goes beyond the second grade of tense-logical involve-
ment. None of the ontologies relate time and modality, and only DAML Time silently 
supports (allows for) branching time models, which certainly gives rise to an interest-
ing challenge.  
5   Towards a Tensed Ontology 
There is no reason to believe that the struggle between A-theorists and B-theories will 
ever be settled. This means that we will probably in all foreseeable future have to deal 
with different time ontologies based on different philosophical positions. It is, how-
ever, worth noting that the logic based on Prior’s third grade, which take instants as 
well as durations into account, seems to be the most general language, we have con-
sidered in this study. In fact, all concepts from all the time ontologies considered can 
be translated into such a logical language. This means that a logical language based 
on the third grade and extended to include durations as well as instants will qualify as 
a language in terms of which time ontologies may be compared. In particular, such a 
language will be fit for Prior’s ideas of a tensed ontology. None of the other grades 
can provide a similar platform for comparison between ontologies. There are, how-
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ever, a number of problems, which should be solved in order to carry out the full 
Priorean program.  
The most common relation in theories of formal ontology is that of a sub-category 
corresponding to statements of the form ‘x is a y’. Prior argued, however, that a satis-
factory ontological system should also take tensed variations of such statements into 
consideration. This means that we should study statements like ‘x has been a y” and 
‘x is a future y’ in an ontological context (see [19: 162 ff].   
Things become rather complicated, since Prior promotes the idea that new entities 
come into being as time passes. Some perfectly sensible statements now, would be 
non-statable in the past. This means for instance, that we can now say things about the 
past events, which could not be stated at all when the events took place. This logic of 
statability is incorporated in Prior’s system Q, according to which the following the-
ses hold: 
 
F(n)(∀x:φ(x)) ⊃ ∀x:F(n)φ(x) 
P(n)(∃x:φ(x)) ⊃ ∃x:P(n)φ(x) 
∀x:P(n)φ(x) ⊃ P(n)(∀x:φ(x)) 
 
whereas ‘the mirror-images’: 
 
P(n)(∀x:φ(x)) ⊃ ∀x:P(n)φ(x)  
F(n)(∃x:φ(x)) ⊃ ∃x:F(n)φ(x) 
∀x:F(n)φ(x) ⊃ F(n)(∀x:φ(x)) 
 
do not hold. The reason for this asymmetry is that ”the values of bound variables may 
receive additions but no deletions as time passes” [19: 172]. A full logic correspond-
ing to Prior’s idea of a tensed ontology will have to integrate Prior’s third grade of 
tense-logical involvement and his Q-system. To the best of our knowledge nobody 
has tried to formulate a formal ontology corresponding to his idea of a growing con-
ceptual framework. There is obviously a lot to do in order to carry out the full Prio-
rean program about tensed ontology.  
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